Uncle Joe, Il Duce, Der Fuehrer, and The Kingfish

A few years ago I found this image of the great dictators of the '30s. I can't remember where I found it. I know it was online, but I don't think I knew its ultimate origins even then.

Anyway, I like it.

I don't understand why Huey's pulling a toy horse, though. Is that a Long reference I'm not getting or is it just part of the Napoleonic setting?

Also, why are Huey and Hitler portrayed as being so much shorter than Stalin and Mussolini? I'm pretty sure that's ahistorical. If Huey were really a dwarf, I think I would have heard about it.

I guess Huey is supposed to be a child compared to the others. Maybe that's what the toy horse is about.

I just noticed a morbid coincidence: Three of these men died from gunshots.

Huey was assassinated, Mussolini was executed, and Hitler committed suicide.

Sic semper tyrannis, I guess, except that good ol' Stalin, who was the bloodiest of the bunch, died of natural causes (officially, anyway).


UPDATE ON THE ORIGINS OF THIS IMAGE: It's titled Impossible Interviews- No. 18: Herr Adolf Hitler and Huey S. "Hooey" Long versus Josef Stalin and Benito Mussolini. It was painted by the Mexican caricaturist Miguel Covarrubias and published in the June 1933 issue of Vanity Fair.

Fahrenholtz Appeals Election Case To Louisiana Supreme Court

According to Ballot Access News, Fahrenholtz has filed his writ application, but the state Supreme Court has not yet decided whether to hear his case.

Dual Redundancy

Earlier this month Jeffrey at Library Chronicles wondered whether U.S. Rep. Bill Jefferson might “pull a Lieberman” and run for the Second District House seat as an independent if he failed to win the Democratic primary. It’s too late for that to happen since the qualifying period for both those options ended on July 11, but Jeffrey’s question lead me to another one: Could Jefferson have qualified as a candidate in the September 6 Democratic primary and as an independent candidate in the November 4 general election?

Louisiana has a law which bans dual candidacy:

RS 18:453 Dual candidacy

A. General prohibitions. A person shall not become a candidate in any primary, first party or second party primary or general election for more than one office unless one of the offices is membership on a political party committee, nor shall a person be a candidate at the same time for two or more different offices to be filled at separate elections.

B. Unexpired and succeeding term of office. A person may become a candidate in a primary or first or second party primary election or general election for the unexpired and the succeeding term of an office when both terms are to be filled at the same election.

C. Political party committees. A person may become a candidate in any primary or general election for membership on more than one committee of a political party, but a person may only become a candidate for one position, either at-large or from a political subdivision, on the same committee of a political party.

First, this law does not really apply to the Bill Jefferson dual Democrat/independent scenario described above, unless the Democratic nomination and the office of U.S. Representative are two different offices.

Second, I’m not sure that law could apply to candidates for federal offices. If it would add a substantive qualification to those that appear in the Qualification Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, then it could not be applied.

However, two other state laws that deal specifically with qualifying for Congressional elections would probably make the above scenario impossible.

RS 18:1275.3(B) says, "A person who desires to become a candidate in the first party primary election must be affiliated with a recognized political party. A person may qualify as a candidate only in the first party primary election of the party with which he is affiliated as shown on his voter registration."

RS 18:1275.17(A) says, "Any person desiring to become a candidate in a general election who is not registered as being affiliated with a recognized political party shall file his notice of candidacy which shall be accompanied by either a ballot access petition or by the qualifying fee required for state candidates as provided in R.S. 18:464."

Since Jefferson would have to be a registered Democrat to qualify for the Democratic primary and "not registered as being affiliated with a recognized political party" to qualify directly for the general election, I guess I shouldn't get my hopes up for an incredibly bizarre 2010 election.

However, if Jefferson is still around then and wants some electoral insurance and/or a place in election law history, he could argue that when 18:1275.17 says "a candidate in a general election who is not registered as being affiliated with a recognized political party," it refers only to the candidate's desired partisan label on the ballot, not to the voter affiliation of the person who is running. (I doubt that argument would win, but I like throwing in every argument that has any chance at all.)


For a less surreal (though, probably, less likely) scenario that could challenge Louisiana's dual candidacy law's application to federal candidates, let us ask what would happen if Barack Obama chose Mary Landrieu as his vice presidential running mate. Would Louisiana’s law against dual candidacy mean that she would have to withdraw from this year’s U.S. Senate race in order to appear elsewhere on the November 4 ballot as a vice presidential candidate? Does a state have the power to restrict federal candidacies in that way?

Even if the courts allowed Louisiana’s dual candidacy ban to be applied to federal elections, Landrieu could argue that a presidential or vice presidential candidate is not really a “candidate” for purposes of the Louisiana law, since the voters are actually electing a slate of presidential electors.

That interpretation, though, raises another question: Could a Louisianan run for Congress and for presidential elector at the same time? (I know that the U.S. Constitution says that “no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector,” but it does not say that a person who has been elected to one of those Congressional offices but has not yet taken office cannot serve as a presidential elector.)

I suppose you could claim that the position of presidential elector is not really an "office" since it is so temporary.

In that case, what if someone wanted to run for U.S. Senator and U.S. Representative at the same time? Could state law stop that?

What if a person wanted to run for two different U.S. House seats at the same time?

What if he wanted to run for all of his state's U.S. House seats at the same time?

Tidmore on Fahrenholtz

Christopher Tidmore of The Louisiana Weekly has written a very good article about the effect that Jimmy Fahrenholtz's departure from the Second District Congressional race would have on the Democratic primary.

There are some points, though, that should be clarified.

Tidmore writes:

"Filing documents for the race ask whether there are outstanding fines owed. Technically, as Fahrenholtz has argued, this question is directed at federal accounts. A candidate for Congress must maintain a separate campaign account for his federal election; cannot transfer any resources from his state account or use his state account to aide his race; and he answers to the Federal Election Commission, not the Louisiana State Board of Ethics. All campaign documents go to the FEC, for example."

The argument that a Congressional candidate is only required to affirm that he does not owe any fines from federal campaigns is an interesting one, but there's no basis for that argument in the state statute, the qualifying form, the U.S. Constitution, or the case law. However, that's not really the issue in the Fahrenholtz case.

Also, the filing documents do not actually "ask" whether there are outstanding fines owed. If they did, then Fahrenholtz could have simply answered "yes." Part of the problem is the fact that it is impossible to sign the required form without affirming that all the statements on it (even the ones that are not legally relevant) are true.

Tidmore continues:

"Houma attorney Conrad S.P Williams III alleged in his lawsuit that the state sets the qualifications for Congressional candidates. If state law requires fines to be paid, then Louisiana law can be used as a justification to jettison a congressional candidate from a contest."

There's no doubt that states do not have the constitutional authority to set the qualifications for Congressional candidates. That's been well established. The question is whether the requirement that candidates not owe any campaign finance fines is a "qualification."

If so, then it's unconstitutional.

Of course, state law could still require that the fines be paid; it just couldn't use the non-payment of these fines as the basis for disqualifying someone from the Congressional ballot.

Fahrenholtz Case Discussed at Ballot Access News

Here's the story.

State Appeals Court Upholds Fahrenholtz's Disqualification

In a 5-to-5 decision, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal has affirmed the trial court's disqualification of Jimmy Fahrenholtz from the Second District Congressional race. The opinion can be found here. The dissents can be found here and here. Since the court could not render a majority decree, the decree was issued in a separate per curiam opinion.

The court ruled that the state's ban on Congressional candidacy by people who owe campaign finance fines does not add a substantial qualification for Congressional candidates. Instead, they likened the ban to the "times, places, and manner" restrictions which states may enact for Congressional elections. They quoted U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton in which the U.S. Supreme Court said that “[s]tates are entitled to adopt ‘generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.’”

However, the "times, places, and manner" restrictions and the sorts of restrictions condoned in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. are nothing like Louisiana's ban on candidacy by people who owe campaign finance fines. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. (immediately after the quote cited in the Fourth Circuit's ruling), the Supreme Court gave examples of "generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself" and which had been approved by the Court previously. Here's the full quotation (I've removed the citations in order to make it more readable, but they can be found in the full text):

States are thus entitled to adopt "generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself." For example, in Storer v. Brown, the case on which petitioners place principal reliance, we upheld the validity of certain provisions of the California Election Code. In so doing, we emphasized the States' interest in having orderly, fair, and honest elections "rather than chaos." We also recognized the "States' strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the political process by preventing interparty raiding," and explained that the specific requirements applicable to independents were "expressive of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot." In other cases, we have approved the States' interests in avoiding "voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies," in "seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently," and in "guard[ing] against irregularity and error in the tabulation of votes." In short, we have approved of state regulations designed to ensure that elections are "`fair and honest and . . . [that] some sort of order, rather than chaos, . . . accompan[ies] the democratic processes.'"

Clearly, the Supreme Court was talking about procedural restrictions necessary to conduct elections in an orderly and fair manner. They were not talking about bans on particular classes of candidates.

They went on to say:

The provisions at issue in Storer and our other Elections Clause cases were thus constitutional because they regulated election procedures and did not even arguably impose any substantive qualification rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot position. They served the state interest in protecting the integrity and regularity of the election process, an interest independent of any attempt to evade the constitutional prohibition against the imposition of additional qualifications for service in Congress. And they did not involve measures that exclude candidates from the ballot without reference to the candidates' support in the electoral process. Our cases upholding state regulations of election procedures thus provide little support for the contention that a state-imposed ballot access restriction is constitutional when it is undertaken for the twin goals of disadvantaging a particular class of candidates and evading the dictates of the Qualifications Clauses.

The Fourth Circuit court claimed that the Louisiana statute in question was a constitutionally-allowed restriction because it "enforces legitimate state interests in governing campaign finance and a duty to protect the integrity of the political process."

I can understand the connection they're trying to make between campaign finance law and "fair and honest" elections, but this sort of ban is far outside the scope of the procedural restrictions that the Supreme Court was talking about.

The Supremes were approving state measures aimed at making sure that the ACTUAL BALLOTING was done in a fair and orderly way. They were not saying that ANY law aimed at reforming the political culture was okay.

The Louisiana court was just wrong on this matter. I am relieved to see how close the decision was. Judge Tobias' opinion (especially his analysis of how Powell v. McCormack and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton apply to the Fahrenholtz case) should have carried the day.

Fahrenholtz has said that he intends to seek reinstatement of his candidacy by a federal court. As Clancy DuBos has pointed out, this case should have already been removed to federal court, since it deals with a federal question.

No Statewide Primaries Yet

Jacques Boudreaux's withdrawal from the U.S. Senate race's Republican primary earlier this week means that Louisianans will have to wait at least two more years (barring some unforeseen vacancy) before we hold a statewide primary under the "new" closed primary electoral system.

While the November 4 ballot for the Senate race is now set, there will still be Democratic primaries in the First, Second, and Fourth U.S. House Districts and Republican primaries in the Fourth and Fifth Districts. None of the state's other three recognized parties will be holding primaries, though there is one Green and one Libertarian in the Second District race and one Libertarian in the Senate race. The Reform Party (whose state organization seems to be dormant) didn't take advantage of their ballot line in any of Louisiana's Congressional races this year.

Those three parties are really missing an opportunity.

For example, if the Louisiana Libertarians had fielded two Senatorial candidates instead of one, then there would be a Libertarian primary for that race scheduled for September 6. Since that would now be the only statewide primary being held on that date, it would have brought a lot of attention to the party. The media would have certainly reported on that race, if for no other reasons than its novelty and the lack of other electoral news.

More importantly, since that primary would have been open to both registered Libertarians and voters who aren't affiliated with a recognized party and since it would have been the only option Louisiana voters had to cast ballots in the Senate race prior to the November general election, the Libertarians could have gotten lots of people used to voting for Libertarian candidates.

Even if that primary race had just been a friendly public discussion between the candidates about Libertarian ideals, it would have had PR value worth much more than the second candidate's $600 qualifying fee.

Instead, Richard Fontanesi will likely stay in the background with the "other" and "no party" candidates on the general election ballot.

Oh, well. There's still two years to recruit candidates for the 2010 Senate race.

Grace on Fahrenholtz

In her article on Jimmy Fahrenholtz's recent disqualification from the 2nd District Congressional race, Stephanie Grace of the Times-Picayune writes:

"Fahrenholtz, citing a separate, seemingly unrelated provision that exempts Congressional candidates, says he'll appeal."

I assume that the "separate, seemingly unrelated provision" that she's talking about is the language in RS 18:463A.(2)(a) (which corresponds to the second part of Clause 6 on Louisiana's generic candidate qualifying form) which says that a candidate must certify "...that he acknowledges that he is subject to the provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act (R.S. 18:1481 et seq.) if he is a candidate for any office other than United States senator, representative in congress, or member of a committee of a political party...."

That provision truly is unrelated to the problem that got Fahrenholtz disqualified. If it were the only basis of his appeal, then the appeal would surely fail. Instead, he should cite U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton in which the U.S. Supreme Court said:

Allowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States. If the qualifications set forth in the text of the Constitution are to be changed, that text must be amended.

Grace also criticizes Fahrenholtz for failing to follow campaign finance laws:

"Sure, there are plenty of worse things a politician can do. Fahrenholtz isn't accused of soliciting bribes, as the man he hoped to unseat, incumbent William Jefferson, is. And he's not accused of taking them, as former school board colleague Ellenese Brooks-Simms has admitted doing, from Jefferson's brother Mose, no less.

But that doesn't absolve Fahrenholtz of his utter indifference toward the law. At the very least, someone who wants to be put in charge of making the rules should show enough respect to follow them."

She's right. It's generally a bad thing for politicians to be indifferent to the law. However, she missed the much more egregious example of such behavior in this case: Louisiana state officials' disregard of the United States Constitution.

LRC Blog references the Winnfield Taser homocide

Manuel Lora calls it a murder.

Jimmy Fahrenholtz disqualified from 2nd District Congressional race

"Jimmy Fahrenholtz has been disqualified from the 2nd Congressional District race, according to Jacques Berry from the La. Sec. of State office.

Fahrenholtz, a Orleans Parish School Board member, said on qualification papers that he did not have any outstanding campaign finance fines from running for school board, however the judge found he does have fines still out against him."

Full article


Fahrenholtz's disqualification presents an interesting legal question. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton that the U.S. Constitution's lists of qualifications for members of the U.S. House and U.S. Senate are exclusive. States cannot add to them. For example, a state may not prohibit a convicted felon (even one who is currently incarcerated) from running for Congress, so long as he or she meets the requirements set forth in Article One.

For U.S. Representatives, those requirements are:
1. Be at least 25 years old.
2. Have been a U.S. citizen for at least 7 years.
3. At the time of the election, be an inhabitant of the state from which he or she is chosen.

If states cannot legally prohibit convicted felons from running for Congress, it does not seem like they could prohibit people who owe campaign finance fines from running for Congress, either. (Please note that Louisiana can place such restrictions on state and local candidates.)

From the news stories I've read, it's not really clear whether Fahrenholtz was disqualified simply because he owed the fines or because he falsely stated on his qualifying form that he did not owe any such fines. If the latter is the reason, then the case might be more difficult.

However, he may still argue that the fault lies with the qualifying form itself.

The current qualifying form provided by the Louisiana Secretary of State contains the following clause:

6. I do not owe any outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, and I acknowledge that I am subject to the provisions of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act if I am a candidate for any office other than United States Senator, Representative in Congress, or member of a committee of a political party. [R.S. 18:463A(2)(a), 18:1481, et seq.]

A candidate does not have the option of marking "yes" or "no" to the above statement. It is merely listed on the form along with several other statements, the last of which is:

10. I meet the qualifications of the office for which I am qualifying; I have read this Notice of Candidacy; and all of the statements contained in it are true and correct. [R.S. 18:463A.(2)]

By signing the form, the candidate is affirming that all the foregoing statements are true. He has no way of saying that some are true and some are not, but that the untrue ones are irrelevant to his legal qualifications as a candidate.

If the state's ban on candidacy by people who owe campaign finance fines cannot be constitutionally applied to U.S. Congressional candidates, then there is an obvious problem. Even though there is no valid law to stop a person who owes such fines from running for Congress, the qualifying form provided by the Secretary of State's office is an obstacle that achieves that same result.

Fahrenholtz might argue that the form itself is invalid because it seeks to add to the Constitution's qualifications for Congressional candidates.

Such a case would also help any convicted felons who want to run for Congress in Louisiana. The current qualifying form also contains the following clause:

9. I am not currently under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony, and I am not prohibited from qualifying as a candidate for conviction of a felony pursuant to Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Louisiana. [R.S. 18:463A.(2)]

The first part of that clause is clearly unconstitutional if applied to Congressional elections, but no imprisoned felon could complete the required form without being made into a liar. The second part of the clause is vague enough that it probably doesn't matter. A convicted felon isn't "prohibited from qualifying as a candidate...pursuant to Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Louisiana" since that part of the state's constitution cannot be applied to U.S. Congressional candidates.

There is a simple way that the Secretary of State could avoid this problem. He could provide one qualifying form (like the current one) for state and local candidates and another qualifying form (without the unconstitutional verbiage) for candidates for U.S. Representative or U.S. Senator.

In the Secretary of State's defense, RS 18:463A.(2)(a) would (if it were not partially unconstitutional) require the current, flawed form.